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43 
The Examiner – Back to the Future 
Lloyd A. Palans*  
The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code1 formally introduced a new 
party to the Chapter 11 landscape – an examiner.  Code section 1104(c) 
(formerly section2 1104(b)) codified the examiner role as a strategic tool to 
advance constituents’ interests.3  However, the scope, use, timing and 
purpose of the role remained to be determined.  This Article focuses on 
Judge Barry Schermer’s creation, structure and innovative use of the 
examiner’s role in the Apex Oil Company et al. case4 in a manner and 
scope that proved to be years ahead of its time. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
The statutory predecessor of the Bankruptcy Code (the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898, also known as the Nelson Act, hereinafter the “Act”) was signed 
into law by President William McKinley on July 1, 1898.5  The Act was 
the first federal statute providing protections from enforcement of 
creditors’ remedies while establishing a uniform bankruptcy system 
throughout the country.  Because the Act did not adequately address the 
restructuring of a corporate capital structure, equity receiverships were 
often utilized to deal with corporate reorganizations.6  The amendments 
made to the Act in 19347 and in 19388 added Chapter X as a substitute for 
equity receiverships for the purpose of providing statutory authority to 
achieve corporate reorganizations, but these amendments failed to fully 
address the comprehensive reorganization of a corporate capital structure.  
Until the mid-1930s, corporate reorganizations were customarily pursued 
through use of equity receiverships.9  Ultimately, however, the Seventh 
 
* Lloyd A. Palans is Senior Counsel at Bryan Cave LLP in St. Louis, Missouri and served as 
examiner in the Apex Oil Company et. al. case described herein. 
1. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1978), [hereafter the “Bankruptcy Code” or “Code”]. 
2. Unless otherwise indicated, “section” or “sections” refer to the applicable section in the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (1978). 
4. See In re Apex Oil Co., 91 B.R. 860 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988); and see In re Apex Oil Co., 
Case No. 87-03804 (Bankr. E.D. Mo filed Dec. 24, 1987) [hereinafter “Apex” or the “Apex Case”]. 
5. National Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544. 
6. See S.E.C. v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 448-49 (1940). 
7. Act of June 7, 1934, Ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911, 912, 11 U.S.C. s203 (repealed 1949). 
8. The Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978). 
9. See U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. at 448-49. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals held that a district court presiding over a 
corporate restructuring had inherent power to appoint persons to aid the 
court in performance of special administrative or judicial duties, utilizing 
services of auditors, investigators and examiners.10  And so, an examiner 
role was functionally created. 
Today, sections 1104(c) and 1106(b) codify the appointment of a 
bankruptcy examiner and the scope of his or her duties.  Code section 
1104(c)(1) provides that the court “shall” order the appointment of an 
examiner to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate if 
(i) no trustee has been appointed; (ii) no plan has been confirmed; (iii) a 
party in interest or the United States trustee has requested an examiner; 
and (iv) “such appointment is in the interest of creditors, any equity 
security holders and other interests of the estate . . . .”11 Code section 
1104(c)(2) separately authorizes appointment of an examiner if the first 
three elements are met and if, in lieu of being in the interest of creditors or 
the estate, “the debtor’s fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than 
debts for goods, services, or taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed 
$5,000,000.”12 
Independence, disinterestedness and objectivity form the foundation of 
an examiner’s role.13 In practice, regardless of whether appointment of an 
 
10. See In re Utils. Power & Light Corp., 90 F.2d 798, 800-801 (7th Cir. 1937). 
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) (1978). 
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(2) (1978). There is a split of authority whether appointment of an 
examiner is mandatory in cases where a debtor’s fixed debts exceed $5,000,000, or whether a court has 
discretion to refuse to appoint an examiner.     Clearly, Code section 1104(c) expressly states the court 
“shall” order appointment of an examiner if the statutory conditions are satisfied regardless of cost or 
need.  In re Revco D.S., Inc., 898 F.2d 498, 501 (6th Cir. 1990); In re UAL Corp., 307 B.R. 80, 86 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).  But, some courts view the appointment as discretionary based on a 
cost/benefit analysis for the estate or whether the request merely serves as a strategic litigation ploy. 
See In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 445 B.R. 277 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Residential Capital, LLC, 
474 B.R. 112, 115-16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“While [s]ection 1104(c) expresses a Congressional 
preference for appointment of an independent examiner to conduct a necessary investigation, the facts 
and circumstances of the case may permit a bankruptcy court to deny the request for appointment of an 
examiner even in cases with more than $5,000,000 in fixed debts.”). Id. at 121. 
13. See In re Interco, Inc., 127 B.R. 633, 638 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991) (“[T]he Examiner’s role is 
by its nature disinterested and non-adversarial.”); In re Southmark Corp., 113 B.R. 280, 284 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 1990) (“[T]he court affirms . . . that the best interests of this estate compel the appointment 
of a disinterested, non-adversarial person with no connections to Southmark’s creditors or equity 
security holders to investigate Southmark’s pre-petition acts and conduct.”); In re Hamiel & Sons, 
Inc., 20 B.R. 830, 832 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (an examiner is a court fiduciary and is “amenable to 
no other purpose or interested party . . .”). 
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examiner is mandatory or discretionary, the common thread for 
appointment arises when the debtor’s prepetition conduct is under scrutiny 
and the appointment of an independent person in the Chapter 11 case is 
appropriate and in the best interests of the debtor’s estate. 
 
II. SCOPE OF APPOINTMENT 
 
Over the years, the scope and duties of examiners have been somewhat 
limited or, perhaps better said, focused.  The role in various cases has 
included review and reporting upon: (i) substantive consolidation as a 
settlement term proposed in a reorganization plan14; (ii) breach of 
fiduciary duty by directors and officers15; (iii) payment of asbestos 
claims16; (iv) intercompany claims and fraudulent conveyances17; (v) 
avoidable transfers, both pre-and post-petition18; (vi) claims against 
insiders and professionals19; (vii) fraud20; (viii) accounting misstatements 
and SEC reporting issues21; (ix) securities fraud22; and (x) going concern 
viability with respect to DIP financing facility.23 
However, the Code is not restrictive in defining the scope of an 
examiner’s role.  Code section 1106(a)(3) specifies that the scope of the 
examiner’s duties broadly encompass investigating “the acts, conduct, 
assets, liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the 
debtor’s business and the desirability of the continuance of such business, 
 
14. In re Am. Classic Voyages Co., No. 01-10954 (JWV), Examiner Report, filed Dec. 4, 2002; 
and see Am. Classic Voyages Co. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (In re Am. Classic Voyages Co.), 367 
B.R. 500 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007). 
15. Troisio v. Poirier (In re U.S.A. Floral Prods.), Nos. 01-1230 (MFW), 03-52514, 05-00039-
KAJ, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38912 (D. Del. July 1, 2005); In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 336 B.R. 
610 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
16. In re Owens Corning, 305 B.R. 175 (D. Del. 2004). 
17. In re Mirant Corp., 314 B.R. 555 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004). 
18. In re Am. Rice, Inc., No. 98-21254-C-11, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 6295 (U.S. Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
Apr. 27, 2010). 
19. Krys v. Sugrue (In re Refco Inc. Sec. Litig.), No. 07-md-1902 (JSR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
33642, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010). 
20. In re SLI, Inc., No. 02-12608, 2005 BL 19967 (Bankr. D. Del. June 24, 2005). 
21. In re Global Crossing, Ltd., Nos. Chapter 11, 02-40187 (REG), 02-40241 (REG), 02-11982 
(REG), 02-13765 (REG), 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1903, at *5-6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2002). 
22. In re Stage Stores, Inc., 269 B.R. 343 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001). 
23. In re Geneva Steel Co., 236 B.R. 770, 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 2001). 
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and any other matter relevant to the case or the formation of the plan[.]”24  
As such, the court has considerable discretion in defining an examiner’s 
role.25  The breadth of Code section 1106(b),26 coupled with that old 
statutory catchall of section 105(a),27 gives a court the ability to “design” 
an examiner’s mandate to suit the needs of the Chapter 11 case. 
Rather than restricting the role of an examiner with limited duties 
answering limited inquires for a limited purpose in the Apex case, Judge 
Schermer used the designer approach creating the role of the Apex 
examiner in an expansive way to expedite resolution of the Chapter 11 
proceeding, akin to creating a so-called roving referee with a whistle.  
Although the appointment of the Apex examiner was made nearly thirty 
years ago, the model adopted by Judge Schermer proved remarkably 
successful, and serves as a blueprint for every examiner in Chapter 11 
business reorganizations today. 
 
III. THE APEX CASE 
 
By way of background, context and color, Apex activated its Chapter 
11 process with the following attributes: (i) a twelve bank secured lender 
group (likely undersecured in its collateral position) asserting aggressive 
positions against Apex based upon a deteriorating collateral position; (ii) 
acrimony and distrust shared by and among the secured lenders and Apex; 
(iii) an emergency motion filed by the secured lenders concurrent with 
commencement of the Chapter 11 process seeking substantive 
consolidation of the assets of an off-shore, non-debtor affiliate owned and 
controlled by the Apex principals; and (iv) alleged diversions of Apex 
assets and working capital to the detriment of the secured lender group.  
Judge Schermer designed the examiner’s role with this litigious 
background in mind. 
 
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(3) (1978) (emphasis added).   
25. See In re Mirant Corp., 314 BR 555, 557 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004) (“Though the wording of 
section 1106(b) of the Code is awkward, the courts have read it as permitting a designer approach to 
assignments given examiners.”). 
26. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (1978) (the section states that the examiner will perform “except to the 
extent the court orders otherwise, any other duties that the court orders the debtor in possession not to 
perform.”). 
27. 11 U.S.C. §105(a) provides “[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol55/iss1/11
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On January 27, 1988, upon application of the Apex Unsecured 
Creditors Committee, Judge Schermer appointed an examiner who was 
directed to examine matters “designated by the court upon request of 
parties in interest.”28  Judge Schermer designed the role to “allow the 
Court the flexibility necessary to place the Examiner in a variety of critical 
situations, thereby enabling the Examiner to make a substantial 
contribution to the completion of this bankruptcy and facilitation of 
settlements and issue resolutions.”29  He authorized the examiner to take 
“any necessary and appropriate actions in furtherance of assisting the 
Court and parties in bringing these proceedings to a just, prompt and 
economic disposition.”30  To enhance the examiner’s facilitator function, 
Judge Schermer prohibited the examiner from advocating for, or aligning 
himself with, the position of any party on any given matter.  Rather, the 
examiner’s role was as that of investigator and mediator.   
Critical to the Examiner’s fulfillment of this mission has been his 
conduct of investigations and mediations which provided 
economical alternatives to potentially expensive, protracted and 
divisive litigation.  These investigations substantially benefited all 
parties by providing a disinterested participant who could assist in 
resolving the many conflicting and competing interests of the 
reorganization process.   
The Examiner’s contribution to Apex’s reorganization embraced 
three primary areas: (1) stabilization of the estate, (2) asset 
disposition, and (3) investigation . . . .31 
 
IV. STABILIZATION 
 
The acrimony, distrust and litigation which exploded upon 
commencement of the Apex Chapter 11 process required immediate 
stabilization to preserve going concern value.  The examiner’s immediate 
focus was to create stabilization from chaos by: (i) monitoring budgeted 
 
28. In re Apex Oil Co., 101 B.R. 92, 93 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989). 
29. In re Apex Oil Co., 111 B.R. 235, 237 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990) (depublished). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
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expenditures and operating reports; (ii) facilitating exchange of financial 
and budgetary information between the warring parties on an ongoing 
basis; (iii) obtaining permission from the secured lenders for Apex to 
purchase and exchange oil futures contracts on the Mercantile Exchange 
thereby permitting resumption of commodity trading activities and 
acquisition of sweet crude oil for Apex refineries; (iv) expediting approval 
of government contracts; (v) monitoring retention of professionals; (vi) 
reviewing applications for compensation by professionals to determine 
compliance with court guidelines; (vii) assuring continuation of utility 
services for oil refineries and other members of the Apex family; (viii) 
preserving executory contracts and unexpired leases (particularly related to 
oil tankers and certain valuable options to purchase same); (ix) providing 
consolidated discovery for numerous reclamation litigants; and (x) 
creating a claims resolution procedure for all Jones Act, worker’s 
compensation and tort claims pending against Apex throughout the 
country (which ultimately resolved over eighty-three percent of claims 
submitted through mediation and settlements).32 
In addition to the foregoing, the examiner mediated a settlement of the 
first-day emergency substantive consolidation litigation affecting assets of 
the off-shore, non-debtor affiliate owned and controlled by the Apex 
principals.  Allegations abounded that Apex had deceived the secured 
lender group about the formation and ownership of its non-debtor affiliate, 
and had diverted Apex assets and corporate opportunities while not paying 
fair consideration for goods and services allegedly obtained from Apex.  If 
permitted to proceed to trial, such litigation would have required discovery 
from twelve different lending institutions, many present and former 
employees of the secured lender group, officers and employees of fifty 
debtors and the off-shore non-debtor affiliate, principals of Apex, and 
numerous consultants and experts for all parties. 
Pursuit of the substantive consolidation litigation to final judgment 
meant potential liquidation for Apex and loss of value for all parties.  
Nonetheless, the examiner’s efforts produced a settlement that:  
[E]liminated a major dispute between the Secured Lender Group 
and the Original Debtors which, if not settled, might have 
 
32. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol55/iss1/11
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jeopardized prospects for a successful reorganization.  In addition to 
resolving a dispute that otherwise would have resulted in time-
consuming and expensive litigation, the settlement allowed the 
Original Debtors to share in net profits of (the non-debtor affiliate) 
and has resulted in payments to the Original Debtors’ Estates 
aggregating $11,560,000 as of August 31, 1989.  As discussed in 
Section V-A of the Disclosure Statement entitled “General 
Description Of The Plan,” up to 35% of the (non-debtor affiliate) 
Cumulative Net Profits will be available to the extent necessary 
after the Effective Date to help service Reorganized Apex’s 
payment obligations under the Series B Notes.33 
With the court’s guidance, the examiner role brought stabilization that, 
in toto, prevented further deterioration of debtor-creditor relationships 
between Apex and its secured lender group, restored use of working 
capital for Apex businesses, and resolved bitter litigation between the 
parties. 
 
V. ASSET DISPOSITION 
 
In addition to achieving stabilization of the estate, the examiner’s role 
in asset dispositions also proved effective.  Of primary importance, the 
examiner conducted a good faith and fair dealing investigation 
surrounding the proposed sale of Apex assets and businesses in 
satisfaction of the secured lenders’ claims at a discount of approximately 
$150,000,000.  This discount created value for Apex unsecured creditors, 
which served as the basis for Apex to reorganize.  Numerous objectors to 
the sale contended that the bid of the stalking horse buyer, AOC 
Acquisition Corp., constituted a lock-out, preventing other bidders to gain 
access to the $150,000,000 discount earmarked to satisfy the secured 
lenders’ claims. The objectors contended that the sale was actually a sub 
rosa plan, and that participation of Apex principals in the proposed sale 
constituted a breach of their fiduciary duties, self-dealing and bad faith.  In 
 
33. See In re Apex Oil Co., 111 B.R. 235 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Feb. 5, 1990) (quoting Apex Oil 
Disclosure Statement Supporting the Debtors’ Joint Partially Consolidation Plan of Reorganization, at 
58 (Dec. 14, 1989)). 
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order to expedite discovery and permit a full evidentiary hearing on the 
proposed sale, the examiner scheduled and enforced consolidated 
discovery for all objectors.34  The court ultimately approved the sale and 
held that the secured lenders could not be compelled to sell their secured 
claims at discount to any other party.35 
In addition to procedurally and substantively addressing the bona fides 
of the section 363 sale of assets, the examiner mediated a settlement of 
substantial claims asserted by the United States Department of Energy 
(DOE) for which potential exposure risks to Apex aggregated 
$354,000,000. These claims were ultimately resolved for the cash payment 
of $15,000,000 by Apex to the DOE.36 
 
VI. INVESTIGATION OF CLAIMS AND  
CAUSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO THE ESTATE 
 
Having stabilized the case and facilitated asset dispositions and 
resolution of claims objections, the examiner conducted an investigation 
of claims available to the estate against non-debtor affiliates and principals 
of the debtors.  In doing so, the examiner faced litigation road blocks, 
including a motion to disqualify the examiner (eventually withdrawn) and 
numerous motions to quash various subpoenas and motions for Rule 2004 
examinations.37  The examiner conducted the investigation on an 
expedited basis over a three-month period, during which he interviewed 
over fifty witnesses including present and former Apex personnel, 
professionals and employees of third parties that represented or did 
business with, against or for Apex over the years.  Further, the examiner 
completed over sixteen Rule 2004 examinations.  The end result was a 
249-page examiner report, as well as a two-volume appendix of exhibits, 
charts and other documents, concluding that Apex had several meritorious 
 
34. The consolidated discovery included concurrent document production in three cities over 
two days followed by fifteen depositions in three cities in less than ten days to enable all parties to 
prepare for an evidentiary hearing and adhere to closing timelines.   
35. In re Apex Oil Co., 92 B.R. 847, 871 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988). 
36. In re Apex Oil Co., 11 B.R. 235, 242 (Bankr. E.D. MO. 1990) (depublished) 
37. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004. Rule 2004 permits the court to order the examination of any party 
relative to the acts conduct, property, liabilities and financial condition of the debtor or to any matter 
which may affect administration of the debtor’s estate.  
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and substantial claims against certain non-debtor affiliates, including 
principals of the debtors.  Shortly after filing the examiner’s report, there 
was a significant increase in consideration paid to creditors of the Apex 
estates. 
 
VII. EXAMINER AS DE FACTO “SPECIAL MASTER” 
 
Although masters38 are sanctioned under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP), masters are not permitted under the Bankruptcy Rules.  
FRCP 53 permits a district court to appoint a master with various powers 
including the power to “hold trial proceedings and make or recommend 
findings of fact on issues to be decided without a jury . . .” in certain 
circumstances, and to “conduct an evidentiary hearing, and exercise the 
appointing court’s power to compel, take and record evidence . . . .”39  
Justice Brandeis characterized a court’s inherent power to appoint persons 
unconnected with the court as special masters, auditors, examiners and 
commissioners as an “instrument for the administration of justice when 
deemed by [the court as] essential.”40 
Rule 9031 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure entitled 
“Masters Not Authorized” provides that “Rule 53 [FRCP] does not apply 
in cases under the Code.”41 Because of this prohibition, masters may not 
be appointed by bankruptcy judges.  Yet, this rule conflicts with Code 
section 1106(a)(3), which provides that the scope of the examiner’s duties 
broadly encompass “any other matter relevant to the case or the formation 
of the plan . . . .”  This statutory provision, together with Code section 
105(a), affords the bankruptcy court the ability to design an examiner’s 
mandate to suit the needs of the Chapter 11 case.42 
In Judge Schermer’s order appointing the Apex examiner, the examiner 
was authorized to take “any necessary and appropriate actions in 
furtherance of assisting the Court and parties in bringing these proceedings 
 
38. A master is generally a court appointed official to make sure that judicial orders are followed 
or to make recommendations to the judge as to the disposition of a matter. 
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(B), (c)(1)(C) (2017). 
40. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920). 
41. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9031 (emphasis added). 
42. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1978); and supra Scope of Appointment discussion section.  
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to a just, prompt and economic disposition.”43  Although the Apex 
examiner was not afforded the power to hold trial proceedings, nor 
conduct an evidentiary hearing, nor exercise the court’s power to compel, 
take and record evidence, a review of the examiner’s role in Apex served 
as the functional equivalent of a “de facto” special master.  A special 
master may be appointed to assist a district court to further the 
administration of justice.  The appointment of the Apex examiner 
functionally accomplished the same purpose. 
A successful plan confirmation achieved by proactive mediators 
recently received notoriety in the Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding of the 
City of Detroit, Michigan.44  Comparing the Apex examiner engagement 
with the work of the mediators in the City of Detroit’s Chapter 9 
bankruptcy proceedings, Judge Schermer was well ahead of his time.45 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that bankruptcy courts “are 
essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings [are] inherently 
proceedings in equity.”46  This is a residual power given to bankruptcy 
courts in Bankruptcy Code Section 105(a) and is consistent with the 
confines of Bankruptcy Code Section 1106(a)(3).  A strong case may be 
made that Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9031 should be 
abrogated to permit bankruptcy courts as a court of equity to appoint 
special masters to promote the administration of justice.47  Rule making 
should not trump an express statutory entitlement. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 When Judge Schermer appointed an examiner in the Apex case in 
 
43. In re Apex Oil Co., 111 B.R. 235, 237 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990). 
44. In re City of Detroit, Michigan, No. 14-CV-14872, 2015 WL 5697702, at (E.D. Mich. Sept. 
29, 2015), aff’d 838 F. 3d. 792 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Ochadleus v. City of Detroit, 
Mich. 137 S. Ct. 1584, 197 L. Ed. 2d 707 (2017), and cert. denied sub. nom. Quinn v. City of Detroit, 
Mich. 137 S. Ct. 2270 (2017). 
45. See Donald Swanson, A Proactive Mediator Role: Special Settlement Master, 
MEDIATBANKRY.COM, May 9, 2017, https://mediatbankry.com/2017/05/09/mediation-ish-roles-part-1-
the-special-master/  (“my sense is that proactive mediation (like that of a settlement master under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 53) is on its way to becoming standard practice for large bankruptcy cases – and for smaller 
cases as well.”). 
46. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934). 
47. See Paulette J. Delk, Special Masters in Bankruptcy: The Case Against Bankruptcy Rule 
9031, 67 MO. L. REV. 29 (2002). 
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January 1988, no party fully appreciated the significance or impact of that 
role.  With the benefit of hindsight, what was accomplished with the 
efficient administration of justice nearly thirty years ago proved to be 
years ahead of its time.  Then, as today, Code sections 1104 and 1106 
together with 105(a) substantively provide for that which Rule 9031 taketh 
away.  As we reflect upon the Apex examiner role created in 1988, Dr. 
Emmett “Doc” Brown, Marty McFly’s friend in the 1985 science-fiction-
comedy movie, Back to the Future,48 comes to mind.  Doc Brown’s time 
machine invention built from a DeLorean automobile sent Marty McFly 
back in time thirty years to repair damage to history.  History has now 
come full circle.  The Apex examiner role crafted by Judge Schermer long 
ago proved to be years ahead of its time, and serves as a blueprint for 
proactive examiner roles for years to come. 
 
 
 
48. BACK TO THE FUTURE (Universal Pictures 1985). 
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